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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of a decision denying a motion to suppress. Appellant, Dale F. Crooks 
brings this appeal from an order of the district court denying his motion to suppress which, in 
part, challenged the lawfulness of a Terry frisk. 
B. Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings 
On April 9,2009 Kootenai County Sheriffs Sergeant Eric Hildebrandt obtained 
information that a person by the name of Kristopher Eby had previously sold methamphetamine 
to one, Katie Kelly and was harassing her to purchase more of the substance. (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 21- 
25.) In a telephone conversation with Kelly, Sgt. Hildebrandt learned that Kelly had purchased 
methamphetamine from Eby in the past and, if he did not have methamphetamine, Dale Crooks 
would supply the methamphetamine. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 1-15.) 
On April 10,2009 Sgt. Hildebrandt arranged for Kelly to engage in a "controlled buy" of 
methamphetamine from Eby. (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 6-7.) Hildebrandt provided Kelly a body wire and 
purchase money and then followed her to a location near Eby's residence located at 3480 Box 
Canyon Drive, in Post Falls. (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 7-15.) While at Eby's residence, Kelly purchased 
methamphetamine from Eby. (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 7-8.) 
After the "controlled buy" Kelly reported to Sgt. Hildebrandt that while at Eby's 
residence, she met with Eby, another individual named Thomas McCauley and Eby's roommate 
"Jerry". (Tr., p. 18, L. 23 - p. 20, L. 1 .) Kelly further conveyed that McCauley provided the 
methamphetamine to Eby who then provided it to her. (Id.) 
Upon completing the "controlled buy" procedure, Sgt. Hildebrandt arranged to have 
members of the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force (NIVCTF) "freeze" Eby's residence, 
while he made efforts to obtain a search warrant of Eby's residence. (Tr., p. 21, Ls. 16-21 .) 
NIVCTF Director FBI Special Agent Michael Sotka responded to Eby's residence to 
assist with a probation search that was conducted by Eby's Probation Officer, Ruth Brownlee. 
(Tr., p. 38, Ls. 5-23.) Upon arriving at the residence, Agent Sotka met up with Brownlee and 
three (3) other members of the North Idaho Violent Crimes Task Force, including Kootenai 
County Sheriffs Deputies Eric Paull and Dennis Stinebaugh and additional task force member, 
Detective Ray Sepulveda. (Tr., p. 62, Ls. 13-1 8.) 
Agent Sotka and Deputy Paull proceeded to the back door of the residence while 
Probation Officer Brownlee and Deputy Stinebaugh and Detective Sepulveda proceeded to the 
front door of the residence to commence the probation search process. (Tr., p. 39, Ls. 10-24; p. 
41, Ls, 2-4.) While at the back of the residence, Agent Sotka heard his fellow officers make 
commands to the occupants of the residence indicating that there had been contact made with 
those person inside. (Tr., p. 41, L. 5 - p. 42, L. 2.) Sotka then proceeded around to the front of 
the residence and entered approximately 30 seconds later. (Tr., p. 42. Ls. 18-21 .) 
Upon making entry into the residence, Agent Sotka found three individuals, including 
Defendant Dale Crooks laying on their stomachs in the front living room. (Tr., p. 42, Ls. 13-17.) 
Agent Sotka also observed Deputy Stinebaugh calling for a fourth individual to come out of the 
back part of the residence. (Tr., 44, L. 5 - P. 45, L. 15.) Agent Sotka assisted Deputy Stinebaugh 
in the handcuffilig of this fourth person as he emerged from a back bedroom of the residence. 
(Id.) 
After each of the four occupants were placed in handcuffs, and after a protective sweep of 
the residence Agent Sotkaperformed pat-down searches of at least two of the individuals who 
had been lying prone on the floor. (Tr., p 46, Ls. 9-22.) Upon searching Defendant Dale Crooks 
Agent Sotka felt a hard object in Crooks' pants pocket. (Tr., p. 47, Ls. 18-20.) Sotka asked 
Crooks what the object was and Crooks replied that it was a pipe. (Tr., p 48, Ls. 2-9.) The pipe 
was removed from Crook's person. (Tr., p. 48, Ls. 9-10.) 
Crooks was arrested and charged with possession of drug paraphernalia and 
methamphetamine. (R., pp. 5,25-26.) On July 13,2009 a hearing was held on Crooks' motion to 
suppress. (Transcript, generally.) After the hearing, the district court concluded that officers 
responding to Eby's residence had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to believe that Crooks 
was committing the offense of frequenting a place where drugs were either being held, used or 
delivered and therefore Crook's detention was warranted. (Tr., p 88,l. 21 - p. 89, I,. 4.) The 
Court further concluded that Agent Sotka's frisk of Crooks was "a reasonable precaution by law 
enforcement." (Tr., p. 90, L. 25 - p. 91, L. 2.) Consequently, the district court denied Crooks' 
motion to suppress. (Tr., p. 92, Ls. 20-24; R., p. 141.) 
On October 26,2009 Crooks timely filed this appeal of the denial of his motion to 
suppress. (R., pp. 215-21 8.) He now offers the following argument is support of his appeal. 
lSSUE PRESENTED 
Did the district court err in holding that Agent Sotka's frisk of Crooks' was objectively 
reasonable where the evidence admitted at the suppression hearing showed that Agent 
Sotka's conduct in frisking Crooks was not based upon any articulable facts to believe 
Crooks was presently armed and dangerous? 
ARGUMENT 
The district court erred in denying Crooks' motion to suppress because Agent Sotka's Terry frisk 
of Crooks was not based upon a particularized suspicion that Crooks was presently armed or 
dangerous but upon the un-particularized statements that weapons are occasionally found during 
drug investigations. 
The Fourth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution, in its guarantee to protect 
individuals from unreasonable government searches and seizures, states: 
"The right of the people to be secue in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched and the person or things to be seized." 
These guaranteed Fourth Amendment protections' are applicable to the State of Idaho 
through the Fourteent1.1 Amendment of the United States Constitution. See, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643,655,81 S.Ct. 1684,1691 (1961). 
If it is shown that evidence was obtained in violation of an individuals' Fourth 
Amendment rights, then that evidence must be suppressed under the 'exclusionary rule'. See, 
State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804,203 P.3d 1203 (2009). 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court created a stop-and- 
frisk exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Our Idaho Supreme Court set 
forth the standard under which a Terry frisk for weapons may be conducted in the recent case of 
State v. Bishop, supra 
Under Terry, an officer may conduct a limited pat-down search, or frisk, "of the outer 
surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons." a 
frisk is only justified when, at the moment of the frisk, the officer has reason to believe 
that the individual he or she is investigating is " armed and presently dangerous to the 
officer or to others" and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter dispels the officer's 
belief. The test is an objective one that asks whether, under the totality of the 
circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would he justified in concluding that the 
individual posed a risk of danger. To satisfy this standard, the officer must indicate " 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those 
facts," in light of his or her experience, justify the officer's suspicion that the individual 
was armed and dangerous. Although an officer need not possess absolute certainty that an 
individual is armed and dangerous, an officer's " inchoate and unparticularized suspicion 
or ' hunch' " is not enough to justify a frisk. An officer may frisk an individual if the 
officer can point to specific and articulable facts that would lead a reasonably prudent 
person to believe that the individual with whom the officer is dealing may be armed and 
presently dangerous and nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel this 
belief. 
146 Idaho at 818-819,203 P.3d at 1217-1218 (citations omitted). 
In Bishop the Court identified several factors which may influence "whether a reasonable 
person in the officer's position would conclude that a particular person was armed and 
dangerous". 146 Idaho at 819,203 P.3d at 1218. These factors include: whether there were any 
bulges in the suspect's clothing that resembled a weapon; whether the encounter took place late 
at night or in a high crime area; and whether the individual made threatening or furtive 
movements, indicated that he or she possessed a weapon, appeared nervous or agitated, appeared 
to he under the influence of alcohol or illegal drugs, was unwilling to cooperate, or had a 
reputation for being dangerous. Id. 
In the present case, none of the factors identified in Bishop existed to warrant a 
reasonable belief by Agent Sotka that Crooks was presently armed or dangerous when the frisk 
of Crooks' person was conducted. There was no testimony that Crooks was nervous or agitated, 
possessed any bulges in his clothing, made any furtive movements or was threatening to the 
officers present at Eby's residence. There was also no testimony that Crooks had a reputation for 
being dangerous or made an admission that he possessed a weapon. 
The evidence admitted at the suppression hearing indicates that Crook's frisk was not 
conducted pursuant to any "particularized suspicion" that he was armed or dangerous; but rather 
as a matter of course. When asked by counsel at the suppression hearing whether he possessed 
any reason to believe that Crooks was armed or dangerous at the time of the frisk, Agent Sotka 
testified: " ... I consider everybody in the residence to be possibly armed." (Tr., p. 62-L. 25 - p. 
63, L. 5.) Agent Sotka further testified that "for our safety, everybody was treated the same." 
(Id.) According to Agent Sotka, he conducted the pat down search of Crooks because, in his 
experience, weapons have been found to be present during narcotics investigations and that the 
FBI classifies drug dealings as a violent-crime offense. (Tr., p. 54, L. 24 - p. 55, L. 20; p. 56, L. 
21 -p. 57, L. 3.) 
Notwithstanding the testimony that a percentage of drug investigations include the 
discovery of weapons, the requirements of Terry still require that law enforcement officers have 
some particularized basis to believe the subject they are dealing with may be armed and 
presently dangerous before a Terry frisk is constitutionally permissible. See, Stafe v. Henage, 
143 Idaho 655,152 P.3d 16 (2007); State v. Bishop, supra. Agent Sotka had absolutely no 
specific articulable facts to believe that Crooks was presently armed or dangerous at the time of 
the frisk. Consequently, the district court erred in holding that the frisk was consitutionally 
permissible and in denying Crooks' motion to suppress. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Defendant Dale Crooks respectfully requests that this 
Appellate Court reverse the decision of the district court denying his motion to suppress. 
k- Dated this @/day of May, 2010. 
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